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Abstract: Paul’s	  strange	  confession	  in	  Galatians	  2:19-­‐20	  poses	  a	  question:	  Is	  the	  “I”	  who	  was	  crucified	  with	  Christ	  and	  no	  longer	  lives	  the	  same	  self	  as	  the	  “I”	  who	  now	  lives	  and	  in	  whom	  Christ	  lives?	  	  To	  ask	  this	  question	  is	  to	  be	  drawn	  into	  conversation	  with	  the	  reception	  history	  of	  Galatians	  and	  also	  to	  be	  invited	  to	  locate	  the	  Pauline	  “I”	  in	  and	  across	  the	  movements	  from	  death	  to	  life.	  This	  article	  suggests,	  in	  dialogue	  especially	  with	  Martin	  Luther,	  that	  for	  Paul	  the	  movement	  from	  the	  state	  of	  creation	  to	  the	  state	  of	  sin	  is	  a	  movement	  from	  life	  to	  death;	  the	  movement	  from	  sin	  to	  salvation,	  conversely,	  is	  a	  movement	  from	  death	  to	  life.	  Within	  or	  across	  these	  ruptures,	  salvation	  is	  as	  radical	  as	  death	  and	  resurrection.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  no	  longer	  and	  now	  living	  selves	  are	  not	  identical:	  the	  “I”	  is	  in	  another	  as	  a	  gift.	  And	  yet,	  the	  “I”	  who	  lives	  by	  grace	  is	  also	  the	  “I”	  who	  was,	  is,	  and	  will	  be	  loved	  by	  the	  “Son	  of	  God	  who	  loved	  me	  and	  gave	  himself	  for	  me.”	  	  	  	  Keywords:	  Paul,	  Galatians,	  Justification,	  Union	  with	  Christ,	  Luther,	  Death,	  Life,	  I	  
 
 
“Methinks we have hugely mistaken this matter of Life and Death.”  
~ Herman Melville, Moby-Dick ~ 
 
 
“Where I am not I,” writes St Augustine, “I am more happily I.” This is, as 
Augustine admits, a strange way of speaking. In context, however, it is provoked by 
another surprising confession: “I have been crucified with Christ and I no longer live, 
but Christ lives in me” (Χριστῷ συνεσταύρωµαι· ζῶ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγώ, ζῇ δὲ ἐν ἐµοὶ 
Χριστός, Gal 2:19-20). For Augustine, this Pauline pattern of speech generates a 
genre: “the speech of the dead.” It is, Augustine insists, “they who are already dead” 
who are “living.”1 
The history of reading Galatians 2:20 is characterized by similar shock: 
“Strange and unheard of,” says Luther; “inconceivable” and an “enigma,” adds 
Schweitzer.2 For E.P. Sanders, “the real bite of Paul’s theology” is expressed in the 
“participatory categories” of texts like Galatians 2:20.3 And yet, when it comes to 
what John Riches calls “the task for interpreters” to account for and understand “the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Augustine, On Continence 29. 
2 Luther’s Works, American Edition, 82 vols. (Philadelphia: Fortress and St. Louis: Concordia, 1955- ), 
26:159 (hereafter, LW); A. Schweitzer, The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle, trans. W. Montgomery 
(New York: Seabury Press, 1931), 3. Cf. S. Eastman, Paul and the Person: Reframing Paul’s 
Anthropology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2017), 1, who refers to the “puzzle of Pauline anthropology.” 
3 E.P. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion (Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 1977), 502, 549. 
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language of participation and mystical union which [Paul] uses,” Sanders waves the 
white-flag of hermeneutical surrender: 
We seem to lack a category of “reality”—real participation in Christ—
which lies between naïve cosmological speculation and belief in magical 
transference on the one hand, and a revised self-understanding on the 
other. I must confess that I do not have a new category of perception to 
propose here.4 
Riches is content to respond to Sanders with pregnant understatement: “This is a 
strange view to take of a text which has exercised such influence throughout 2000 
years of human history.”5 Kevin Vanhoozer, however, is more diagnostic: to say 
“participation is central to Paul’s theology but largely inaccessible today” is 
symptomatic of a fragmented theological context in which “various ditches, some 
uglier than others, have created divides and led to misunderstandings between biblical 
studies” and “historical... and systematic theology.”6 Vanhoozer’s interpretative 
prescription is to “name and navigate” these ditches: “we have a better chance of 
responding to [the] questions” raised by Paul’s language of “union with and 
participation in Christ” if we take “into account exegetical, [reception] historical, and 
systematic theological perspectives.”7 The act of exegesis, in others words, raises 
deep interpretative questions that invite and even require what Michael Allen calls 
theological retrieval and “ressourcement” as integral aspects of “exegetical 
reasoning.”8 
 This invitation to engage in theological retrieval and attend to reception 
history has been accepted by some. Richard Hays answered Sanders’ interpretative 
agnosticism with a set of possible concepts within which to understand Paul’s 
language of participation. Some of Hays’ suggestions are contextual or critical 
possibilities (e.g., familial and political solidarity or narrative participation). But one 
has a rich historical and theological pedigree: “My own guess is that” a consideration 
of Paul’s language “would be…clarified by careful study of participation motifs in 
patristic theology, particularly the thought of the Eastern fathers.”9 This guess has 
generated further research. Michael Gorman, for instance, makes regular recourse to 
the language of theosis to interpret Paul: “To be in Christ is to be in God… this means 
that for Paul…conformity to the crucified Christ…is really theoformity, or theosis.”10 
For Grant Macaskill, “Gorman’s work represents a welcome attempt to offer a 
coherent account of Paul’s theology…and to do so with a willingness to draw upon 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 522-23. The quotation is from John Riches, Galatians 
through the Centuries (Oxford: Blackwell, 2013), 137.  
5 Riches, Galatians, 137. 
6 Vanhoozer, “From ‘Blessed in Christ’ to ‘Being in Christ’: The State of the Union and the Place of 
Participation in New Testament Exegesis and Systematic Theology Today,” in In Christ in Paul: 
Explorations in Paul’s Theology of Union and Participation (eds. M.J. Thate, K.J. Vanhoozer, and 
C.R. Campbell; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2018), 6-7. 
7 Vanhoozer, “From ‘Blessed in Christ’ to ‘Being in Christ,’” 11. 
8 M. Allen, “It Is No Longer I Who Live”: Christ’s Faith and Christian Faith,” JRT (2013): 3-26 (5). 
See also G. Macaskill, Union with Christ in the New Testament (Oxford: OUP, 2013), 3-4. 
9 R. Hays, “What Is ‘Real Participation in Christ’? A Dialogue with E.P. Sanders on Pauline 
Soteriology,” in Redefining First Century Jewish and Christian Identities: Essays in Honor of Ed 
Parish Sanders (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008), 336-51; R. Hays, The Faith 
of Jesus Christ: The Narrative Substructure of Galatians 3:1-4:11 (2nd ed., Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2002), xxxii. 
10 M. Gorman, Inhabiting the Cruciform God: Kenosis, Justification, and Theosis in Paul’s Narrative 
Soteriology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 4. 
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theological conceptualities.”11 That said, Gorman’s deployment of theosis in the 
service of Pauline exegesis exhibits, as Macaskill points out, “some serious 
problems.” Despite Hays’ call for a “careful study” of the Eastern fathers, “Gorman 
does not actually engage with the patristic writings, nor does he offer much by way of 
an actual definition of theosis.” This latter point is particularly problematic as the 
term is “theologically plastic.” The language of theosis is used within and as part of a 
theological synthesis in which its potential to confuse or merge creator and creation is 
constrained by both incarnational and Trinitarian dogma—a constraint that appears 
absent in Gorman both as he claims too little (e.g., cruciformity as a moral trope 
indicating a manner of living patterned after the crucified and risen Christ) and as he 
claims too much (e.g., theosis suggests that “obedience and faith” amounts to “a 
participation in the being…of God.”12  
The point here is not to critique Gorman in particular. Rather as I contend for 
theological retrieval for the sake of exegesis, this is a reminder of the demands and 
difficulty of this task: it requires patient attention to the sources, an awareness of the 
history and debates surrounding doctrines, an understanding of the ways terms and 
concepts are borrowed, baptized, and embedded within larger frames by Christian 
theology, as well as an openness to tracing the relationship between texts and the 
theological resources that have been utilized in the service of reading them. In this 
sense, Macaskill’s book, Union with Christ in the New Testament, which offers 
covenant and divine presence as ways to conceptualize union in terms of 
representation and inter-personal communication, is a model: it engages the scriptural 
and early Jewish backgrounds as well as the reception historical and theological 
foregrounds of union with Christ before exploring that theme across the New 
Testament. The cost of this breadth, of course, is depth. Macaskill calls Galatians 
2:19-20 “the most obviously participatory language in Galatians,” and yet he only 
devotes seven lines to its analysis.13  
My aim in this paper is to join those who have accepted the invitation to read 
Paul with recourse to reception history and theological reflection, but to do so in a 
more focused manner. For this reason, I will limit myself to one principal dialogue 
partner, Martin Luther, and one primary text, Galatians 2:20.  
Which brings us back to “the speech of the dead.” Paul’s confession gestures 
towards a strange and surprising simultaneity: “I no longer live,” says Paul; “the life I 
now live,” he adds. Listening to Augustine while reading Galatians indicates that the 
bishop is endeavoring to speak according to Paul’s modus loquendi: “I am not I, I 
am,” or again, “they who are already dead [are] living.” To attend to—to be addressed 
by and to learn to speak—according to this Pauline pattern, however, is also to 
encounter a question: Who—or even which I—am I? Expressed in terms of the text: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Macaskill, Union with Christ in the New Testament, 27.  
12 Macaskill, Union with Christ in the New Testament, 27, 74-75. For an account of Pauline soteriology 
that engages with patristic theologies of theosis in both depth and detail, see B.C. Blackwell, 
Christosis: Engaging Paul’s Soteriology with His Patristic Interpreters (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2016).  
13 Macaskill, Union with Christ in the New Testament, 220-21. For a dogmatic account that resonates 
with Macaskill’s, see M. Allen, who refers to “personal union” as “the stuff of covenant and 
communion” (Sanctification [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2017], 225). Another recent study that 
explores conceptual resources with which to understand and translate Paul’s participatory account of 
human personhood is found in S. Eastman, Paul and the Person. Eastman, however, does not engage 
the theological tradition so much as bring Paul into conversation with contemporary research in 
developmental psychology and philosophy of mind. For interaction with Eastman, see J.A. Linebaugh, 
“Participation and the Person in Pauline Theology,” JSNT 40.4 (2018): 516-523.  
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Is (or are) the I that no longer lives and the I that now lives the same I? Pursuing this 
question is the purpose of this paper, and I will do so with reference to Luther’s 
reading of Galatians, which, in contrast to some other theologies stemming from 
Augustine, captures the Pauline pattern according to which the “I” both is not, but 
also is, the same someone. 
 
 
Identifying the No Longer Living “I” 
 
 “One speaks theologically about the human being,” Oswald Bayer comments 
on Luther’s Disputatio de homine, “from three vantage points”: as creature, as sinner, 
and as redeemed.14 The question, of course, concerns the relationship between these 
three designations. David Kelsey, for instance, insists that while the categories of 
creation, salvation from sin, and eschatological completion share the same 
anthropological structure (i.e., each emphasizes that human being is dependent being), 
they are not a single but three stories of the self. In his words, “the canon is made 
whole by three kinds of inseparable narratives, each of which has a distinct plot or 
narrative logic that cannot be conflated with either of the other two.” Consequently, 
“the array of claims made in theological anthropology” in “Holy Scripture…cannot be 
ordered into a single systematic structure.”15 For Luther, by contrast, while the 
ruptures between creation and sin and between sin and salvation are real and radical, 
the three aspects are more closely related: “the human is God’s creation”; this creature 
“was subjected after Adam’s fall to the power of the devil, which means, under sin 
and death”; “only through the Son of God, Christ Jesus, can [the person] be freed and 
be given eternal life as a gift.”16 
 Galatians 2:20 confesses an I that no longer lives and an I that now lives. The 
relationship between these two lives is described as death: “I have been crucified with 
Christ.” The exegetical challenge is both to identify each I and also to ask if and in 
what sense each I can be identified with the other. In other words: who no longer 
lives, who now lives, and are the two related despite being divided by death? 
 Martinus de Boer stands out somewhat among commentators on Galatians in 
that he explicitly asks who or which I Paul describes as having died. Taking his cue 
from Galatians 2:19a and its announcement of a death “to the law,” de Boer suggests 
that the expression “to die to” is “metaphorical and means to become separated from.” 
It is thus Paul’s life with respect to the law that ends, his “nomistic I,” to use de 
Boer’s phrase.17 Beverly Gaventa protests at this point, insisting there is “no sign that 
this death and life are the death and life of the nomistic self only.” On the contrary, 
for Gaventa, as Paul’s more obviously comprehensive statements about dying with 
Christ in Romans 6 and 2 Corinthians 5 indicate, Galatians 2:20 puts  “the whole of 
the ego” in the grave.18 Part of what pressures de Boer in this direction, however, is, 
to quote Luther again, the “strange and unheard-of” confession of Paul. It is, de Boer 
sees, in being “crucified with Christ” that the “nomistically determined I died,” but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 O. Bayer, Martin Luther’s Theology: A Contemporary Interpretation (trans. Thomas H. Trapp; 
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 154. 
15 D. Kelsey, Eccentric Existence: A Theological Anthropology (Louisville: Westminster John Knox 
Press, 2009), 10, 897. 
16 LW 34:148; D. Martin Luthers Werke, Kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. J. F. K. Knaake et al., 57 vols. 
(Weimar: Böhlau, 1883ff), 39I:176.7-13 (hereafter, WA). 
17 M. de Boer, Galatians (Louisville: WJK, 2011), 159-161. 
18 B. Gaventa, “The Singularity of the Gospel Revisited,” Galatians and Christian Theology: 
Justification, the Gospel, and Ethics in Paul’s Letter (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2014), 193. 
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such language, while said to be “realistic and serious,” is finally labeled 
“metaphorical and hyperbolic” and thus “cannot be taken literally.”19  
 It is, however, just this assumption that Paul’s confession resists. Galatians 
2:20 is not an analogy between Christ’s death and a death-like experience of the I. 
Galatians 2:20, rather, is an announcement that Christ’s death is the death of the I. To 
retreat to the language of non-literal and hyperbolic is to miss the radical reframing 
required by Paul’s language. In Gerhard Ebeling’s words, “it is not life and death as 
they are that set the terms within which” Galatians 2:20 “must be made to fit.” On the 
contrary, “it is the all-inclusive relationship to Jesus Christ that sets the terms by 
which the decision is made as to the meaning of life and death. Christ is not given his 
place in the order of life and death.” Instead, “life and death are given their decisive 
place in Christ.”20 As Death says to the god Apollo after a resurrection-like rescue in 
Thornton Wilder’s play, The Alcestiad, “You broke the ancient law and order of the 
world: that the living are the living and the dead are the dead.” Apollo’s response: 
“Death, the sun is risen. You are shaking… Start accustoming yourself to change.”21    
 Reoriented in this way, it is possible to avoid de Boer’s conclusion that “the 
extreme language of crucifixion with Christ gives expression to…the loss of a 
previous manner of life.” According to Galatians 2:20, it is not only a manner of life 
that is lost; it is life that is lost: “I no longer live.” But this only sharpens the question: 
Who no longer lives? What is this life that ends in death with Christ?  
Luther both asked and answered this question: “Who is this me? It is I, an 
accursed and damned sinner.”22 For Luther, the human qua peccator is precisely the 
human not living according to their nature qua creatura: created to live outside the 
self through faith in God and love for others, the sinner is curved in on and in love 
with the self; created in and for freedom, the sinner is bound yet still answerable; 
created to worship and receive from God, the sinner idolizes and attempts to save her 
or himself.  
Paul, like Luther, knows of a creation in which sin is unnatural, into which 
“sin came” (Rom 5:12). But he also knows that into this creation, sin did in fact come, 
and since then, “from Adam,” Paul says, “death reigned” (Rom 5:14). The initial I of 
Galatians 2:20, the I who no longer lives, is thus the I that exists east of Eden and in 
Adam. There are several Pauline phrases that describe this “life” (e.g., “under sin” 
and “according to the flesh”), but they converge in a common diagnosis: this life is 
death.23 However much the Pauline authorship of Ephesians continues to be disputed, 
the opening lines of Ephesians 2 are indisputably Pauline: “dead in your trespasses 
and sins.” As Luther argued within but also against his inherited Augustinian tradition 
(and to anticipate the argument to come), the person qua peccator is not merely 
incomplete and wounded (and thus only in need of a grace that perfects and heals); 
the sinner is captive, complicit, and a corpse (and thus in need of a grace that delivers, 
forgives, and resurrects). In Galatians, the linguistic web of curse, imprisonment, 
slavery, sin, and death all gesture in the direction of this diagnosis. In our passage, 
however, it is expressed in the unexpected dative phrases about dying to the law in 
order to live to God: if death in one relationship is required for there to be life in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 de Boer, Galatians, 159-161. 
20 G. Ebeling, The Truth of the Gospel: An Exposition of Galatians (trans. D. Green; Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1985), 143. 
21 T. Wilder, The Alcestiad in The Collected Short Plays of Thornton Wilder: Volume II (ed. A.T. 
Wilder; New York: Theatre Communications Group, 1998), 224. 
22 LW 26:177. 
23 Cf. Ebeling, The Truth of the Gospel, 142: Paul “describes Adamic life as death.” 
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most fundamental relationship (i.e., life in relation to God), then the most basic thing 
to say about the present life is that it is not life. To borrow another provocative yet 
profoundly Pauline sentence from Augustine, “In comparison with [life with God], 
what we have now should be called death.”24      
 Two theological consequences follow from the depth of Paul’s diagnosis. 
First, the movement from—or perhaps better, the rupture between—creation and sin 
is a movement from life to death. Sin came, says Paul, and death reigned. And that 
suggests, second, that Paul’s diagnosis requires a redefinition of death. Death is not, at 
least according to Paul’s deepest sense, what waits at the end of life in the flesh; death 
is life in and according to the flesh. In Bonhoeffer’s words, “this life is dead,” not 
because “one no longer exists,” but rather because the relation with God that defines 
and grounds the human creature is contradicted: instead of living with and from God, 
the sinner “lives out of” the self and in relation to sin “and thus is dead.”25 To bring 
this definition of death closer to the Pauline pattern of Galatians 2:20, to be dead is to 
live with death before rather than behind you: death is life before and apart from death 
with Christ.  
So again: Who is the I who no longer lives? One way to answer this question 
with Paul is to say: the I who dies is the one who is dead.       
 
 
Death with and Life in Christ 
 
 If the proclamation of Christ crucified is foolishness to Greeks, the Pauline 
announcement of crucifixion with Christ has been a stumbling block to interpreters. 
The scholarly habit of classifying Paul’s confession as “nonliteral,” “figurative,” and 
“hyperbolic” is, if unsatisfying, at least unsurprising: “the speech of the dead” is a 
difficult language.26 There is, however, another and older tradition that, as Luther 
concludes, also domesticates Paul’s confession of death. Thomas Aquinas, for 
example, can capture the image of some of Paul’s most startling claims: “I have been 
crucified with Christ,” reads Thomas, and then he writes, “the love of Christ…on the 
cross for me brings it about that I am always nailed with him.”27 The death that occurs 
in this case, however, is not that of a who but of a what: it is not the person that is 
crucified with Christ on Thomas’ reading but rather, in his words, “concupiscence or 
the inclination to sin, and all such have been put to death in me.”28  
For Thomas, “the justification of the unrighteous is a movement…from the 
state of sin to the state of justice,” a movement that is non-temporal but nevertheless 
ordered: first, an infusion of grace; second, a movement of the will towards God in 
faith; third, a movement of the will away from sin; and fourth, the remission of 
guilt.29 Within this movement, the person is radically altered. Human nature, both as 
created and fallen, is, by grace, perfected and healed. But the maxim holds: gratia non 
tollit naturam sed perficit (“grace does not destroy but perfects nature”). When 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Augustine on Psalm 119. Cf. Kelsey’s designation of “sin as living death,” Eccentric Existence, 864. 
25 D. Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2004 [1937]), 90-91.  
26 For representative uses of these terms to describe Galatians 2:19-20, see J.L. Martyn, Galatians: A 
New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (New York: Doubleday, 1997), 278; de Boer, 
Galatians, 160; Ebeling, The Truth of the Gospel, 144 (though Ebeling is arguing against rather than 
for a “figurative” interpretation).    
27 Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Saint Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians by St. Thomas Aquinas 
(trans. F. R. Larcher; Albany: Magi, 1966), 63. 
28 Thomas Aquinas, Galatians, 62.  
29 Summa Theologica IaIIae q. 113. 
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reading Galatians, this means, for Thomas, that when Paul announces a “new 
creation” (Gal 6:15), he is actually naming a new creature, a person who in turn is not 
so much new as renewed: this is not a new life but instead what Thomas calls a new 
“manner of life,” a habit of living characterized by “faith formed by love.”30 The I, in 
other words, survives their salvation. The movement is drastic—from the state of sin 
to the state of justice—but it does not include or go through death. As Heiko Oberman 
summarizes what he calls the “unanimous medieval tradition”—exhibited not just in 
Thomas but also in “Duns Scotus, Gabriel Biel” and “the Council of Trent”—“the 
iustitia Dei remains the finis, the goal…of the viator who is propelled on his way…by 
the iustitia Christi (i.e., by the infusion of grace).”31 “Life,” in Daphne Hampson’s 
words, “is a via for our transformation,” a road to righteousness along which one’s 
new manner of life, caused by grace and characterized by faith working through love, 
is the form of righteousness.32 
But here is Luther’s alternative: “where they speak of love” as the form 
righteousness, “we speak of faith” which “takes hold of Christ” because “he is the 
form”—he is “true Christian righteousness.”33 As Luther reads Paul’s negation of 
ἔργα νόµου and his announcement of righteousness διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, he 
hears the apostle locating justification outside of the person and, as per Galatians 
2:17, “in Christ.” In his words, “when it is necessary to discuss Christian 
righteousness, the person must be completely rejected” because, negatively, the “I, as 
a person distinct from Christ, belongs to death and hell” and, positively, because 
Christ “is our righteousness and life.”34 Oberman captures the contrast: For the 
medieval tradition the “iustitia Dei” is “the Gegenüber,” the “standard according to 
which” a human life “will be measured in the Last judgment;” for Luther, “the heart 
of the Gospel is that the iustitia Christi and the iustitia Dei coincided” such that “the 
sinner is”—now and definitively—justified, a reality that “forms the stable basis and 
not the uncertain goal of life.”35 Interpreting Galatians this way, Luther not only can 
but also is compelled to embrace the language of death. Speaking in persona Pauli, 
Luther demonstrates his fluency in the speech of the dead: “I am not living as Paul 
now, for Paul is dead… my own life I am not living.”36    
 Returning to Galatians from this history of reading it, Paul’s confession of 
crucifixion with and new life in Christ sounds like a dramatic depiction of an I who 
suffers a rupture as deep as death and as radical as resurrection. If the Pauline 
diagnosis of the movement from created to “under sin” is that it is a movement from 
life to death, the Pauline declaration of the movement from “under sin” to “in Christ” 
names a movement from (and through) death to life.  
One way to get textual traction on this counter-intuitive claim is to attend to 
Paul’s use of the dative case and prepositional phrases and prefixes in Galatians 2:19-
20. As Susan Eastman notes, “Paul’s astounding self-description is all about death 
and life.” The order, however, is alarming: death dominates v.19 whereas life follows 
in v.20. The effect, as Ebeling points out, is that “what is said about life begins and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Thomas Aquinas, Galatians, 53-55, 205-206. 
31 H. Oberman, “Iustitia Christi and Iustitia Dei: Luther and Scholastic Doctrines of Justification,” in 
The Dawn of the Reformation: Essays in Late Medieval and Early Reformation Thought (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1986): 104-25. 
32 D. Hampson, Christian Contradictions: The Structures of Lutheran and Catholic Thought 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2001), 83, see also 2-3, 56-96. 
33 LW 26:129-130, cf. 126-28. 
34 LW 26:166-67. 
35 Oberman, “Iustitia Christi and Iustitia Dei, 19, 20, 25.  
36 LW 26:170. 
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ends with references to death: the death of the self (‘I no longer live’) and the death of 
and with Christ (‘the son of God gave himself for me’ and ‘I have been crucified with 
Christ’).” Life, for Paul, is not the existence of the I before death; life is what emerges 
out of and after death. This Pauline pattern—both the unexpected order and the 
implied redefinitions—unsettles the understandable assumption that life and death are 
only the material subsistence or cessation of a created substance. According to Paul’s 
grammar, death and life are not absolute concepts, they are relative—or better: 
relational. In Galatians 2:19, life and death are first defined with the dative: death is 
death to the law and life is life to God. As the confession continues, prepositions color 
in these relations christologically: Christ died for me (ὑπὲρ ἐµοῦ), which is itself the 
concrete gift (Gal 2:21) that grounds and includes my having been crucified with 
(σύν) Christ and on the far side of which “Christ lives in me” (ἐν ἐµοί).  
Luther caught the implications: when defining death and life theologically 
(and, as we will see below, when identifying the I), “we cannot think in terms of the 
category of substance, but only in the category of relation.”37 Attempting to answer a 
perennial exegetical question—what is the nature of the believer’s crucifixion with 
Christ and how does it occur?—Luther offers what he takes to be a Pauline and 
relational answer: “I have been crucified and have died with Christ. How? Through 
grace and faith.” This reply is shaped by the terms given in Galatians: righteousness is 
through faith and the death of Christ is the “grace of God” that gives righteousness 
(2:16, 21). For Luther, however, grace and faith also specify the fundamental form of 
the divine-human relationship: “God,” who as creator and redeemer is giver, “does 
not deal with us…except through” grace—that is, “through the word of promise. We, 
in turn, cannot deal with God except through faith.”38 Named from the giving side, 
this relation is called grace; named from the being-given-to side, the relation is called 
faith. To say, then, that one is crucified with Christ “through grace and faith” is to 
say, in Ebeling’s words, that “dying” is “caught up in our relationship with” Christ 
just as Paul’s dative and prepositional phrases—“live to God” and “Christ lives in 
me”—indicate that “living” is “defined with reference to” and in relationship with 
God and Christ.39 
This connection between a relational understanding of the self and a realistic 
reading of Paul’s language of death and life is evident in Susan Eastman’s recent 
study, Paul and the Person. “Insofar as the self is always a self-in-relationship,” she 
writes, the relational rupture occasioned by crucifixion with and life in Christ—that 
is, the rupture between being a self-in-relation to sin and being a self-in-relation to 
Christ—is the death of the old I even as it is the birth of the new.40 There is, in Ian 
McFarland’s words, a “shift in relation” that “comes entirely from God’s side” and, as 
“grace,” “has no ground in human being” even as it grounds human being: “our lives 
are…defined and sustained not by our natural capacities or incapacities but solely by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 WA 40/II:354 3f. For “relational ontology” in Luther, see W. Joest, Ontologie der Person bei Luther 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1967) and G. Ebeling, Dogmatik des christlichen Glaubens 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1979). For the application of this category to Paul, see E. Rehfeld, 
Relationale Ontologie bei Paulus: Die ontische Wirksamkeit der Christusbezogenheit im Denken des 
Heidenapostels (WUNT II.326. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck). Though in dialogue with different fields and 
voices, Eastman’s Paul and the Person also argues for a thoroughly relational account of Pauline 
anthropology. 
38 LW 36:42. For God as giver in both creation and redemption, see Luther exposition of the three 
articles of the creed in his Confession Concerning Christ’s Supper (LW 37:66; WA 26, 505, 38-506, 
7). 
39 Ebeling, The Truth of the Gospel, 138-40.  
40 Eastman, Paul and the Person, 160. 
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God’s word.”41 The Pauline pattern of defining death and life in relation to Christ is 
thus a form of preaching the Pauline gospel: a person is not determined by what they 
have inherited or achieved—not by biology or biography, by pedigree or 
performance—but by God’s gift of Jesus Christ.  
What this requires, however, is attending to the soteriological register of death 
and resurrection in which Paul writes. Learning this language with and from Paul 
entails following a pattern of speech in which the divine acts of creation and salvation 
are spoken together. In Romans 4:5 and 4:17, for instance, God’s unconditioned grace 
rhymes in three radical forms: creatio ex nihilo, resurrectio mortuorum, and 
iustificatio impii.42 Picking up this pattern, Luther offers mutually interpreting 
accounts of creation and justification. In his explanation of the first article in the 
Small Catechism, creation is confessed with recourse to soteriological categories: 
“God has created me together with all creatures…purely because of his fatherly and 
divine goodness and mercy, without any merit or worthiness on my part.”43 The 
antithetical grammar and technical vocabulary of justification are used here in 
relationship to creation—not by or in consequence of human merit or worth, but 
purely—that is, solely—through divine mercy and goodness—that is, through grace. 
The effect is a confession of creatio ex nihilo in the language of salvation sola gratia: 
“out of nothing” means “by grace alone”—it means, in Oswald Bayer’s words, 
creation “as an absolute, categorical giving,” a gift “that finds nothing in its recipient” 
but contradicts that nothingness by calling them into being.44 If Paul describes a 
divine modus operandi in Romans 4 by linking the predications of the God who 
justifies, creates, and resurrects, Luther channels Paul as he characterizes God as the 
one whose way is to “make something out of nothing,” who, as creator, always 
operates with incongruous grace: God “accepts no one except the abandoned, makes 
no one healthy except the sick, brings no one to life except the dead, [and] makes no 
one holy except sinners.”45   
As this begins to indicate, the interpretative traffic runs both ways for Luther. 
In the Heidelberg Disputation, for example, Luther brings language from the doctrine 
of creation to a soteriological thesis: “the love of God does not find but creates that 
which is pleasing to it.”46 A similar move is evident in a series of later disputations 
prompted by Romans 3:28: “in the divine work of justification,” argues Luther, the 
negation of works and the incongruity between human unrighteousness and God’s 
pronouncement of righteousness forces us to “say with Paul that we are nothing at all, 
just as we have been created out of nothing.” Thus, in being justified, the homo 
peccator is, from this “nothing,” “called righteous” and so, ex nihilo, constituted as “a 
new creature.”47 What Luther is tuned into is the way the disjunction in Paul between 
what God says and those to whom he speaks suggests that words like καλέω and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 I.A. McFarland, “The Upward Call: The Category of Vocation and the Oddness of Human Nature,” 
in The Christian Doctrine of Humanity: Explorations in Constructive Dogmatics (eds. O.D. Crisp and 
F. Sanders; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2018), 217-236 (231, 235). 
42 See O. Bayer, “The Ethics of Gift,” LQ 24 [2010]: 447-68 (452); cf. Linebaugh, God, Grace, and 
Righteousness in Wisdom of Solomon and Paul’s Letter to the Romans: Texts in Conversation 
(NovTSup 152; Leiden: Brill, 2013), 152-54 and E. Käsemann, An die Römer (HNT 8a; Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 1973), 116-17. 
43 BSLK 510.33-5.11.8. 
44 Bayer, “The Ethics of Gift,” 452. 
45 WA 1 183.39-184.7; cf. Käsemann, Römer, 117: “daß Gott immer nur dort schafft, wo irdisch nichts 
vorhanden ist.” 
46 LW 31:41; WA 1:354-35: “Amor dei non invenit, sed creat suum diligibile.” 
47 LW 34:113, 156. 
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δικαιόω function as verbal verbs—works of God enacted as words of God.48 God’s 
calling, for instance, calls into being: where there was a “not my people” God calls 
and thereby creates “my people”; to those who were “not loved” God calls and so 
creates the “loved” (Rom 9:24). Or again, to those who are sinners and unrighteous, 
God does the verbal verb δικαιόω and thereby creates the opposite: “all sinned…and 
are justified” (Rom 3:23-24; cf. 4:5; 5:6-10; Gal 2:15-21).49  
 Luther is thus reading with the grain of Paul’s theology. In Galatians, the 
grammar of the gospel is christological and just so incongruous, creative, and 
charismatic: it is Christ, the χάρις or gift of God, given at the site of sin and death, 
that creates righteousness and life.50 As 2 Corinthians 4:6 has it, it is the creator who 
said “Let light shine out of darkness” who shines into us by speaking the recreative 
and redemptive word of “Jesus Christ.” Citing both this verse and Romans 4, Luther 
insists that neither creation nor new creation are the kindling of a “spark” “out of a 
gleaming coal;” but rather “out of darkness light; out of death life, out of sin 
righteousness.”51 To bring Paul and Luther together by borrowing from Kathyrn 
Tanner, for both the apostle and his Reformation reader, “the grace” that saves “us 
has its analogue in the divine act that created us—from nothing.”52  
Paul’s good news is thus as deep as his diagnosis. “Sin came,” “death 
reigned,” and life in Adam and “under sin” is death. Correspondingly, redemption 
takes the form of resurrection as the I who is dead dies with Christ and new life is 
created as grace opens the grave. In Luther’s most succinct formulation: “death and 
resurrection…is full and complete justification.”53  
What this reading requires is a christological and relational definition of life to 
pair with the previous definition of death: if being dead is living with death before 
you, being alive is living with death behind you. Or again, to make the christological 
relation more explicit: death is life before and apart from death with Christ; life is life 
after and out of death with Christ.    
      
 
Identifying the Now Living “I” 
   
The opening question still stands: Is (or are) the I that no longer lives and the I 
that now lives the same I?  
 
No: I am not Me 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 According to Bayer’s reconstruction, Luther’s reformation breakthrough is tied up with a 
development in his understanding of language: rather than a word functioning only as a sign (signum) 
that refers to a reality (res), Luther came to see that God’s words (verba Dei) are God’s work (opera 
Dei), that divine speech establishes rather than merely refers to reality. The signum thus is the doing of 
the res and therefore, in the tradition of Psalm 33:9—“God spoke and it was done”—Luther describes 
the divine address as a verbum efficax (LW 5.140; cf. O. Bayer, Promissio: Geschichte der 
reformatischen Wende in Luthers Theologie [2nd ed., Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 
1989]).  
49 Consider this line from a Lutheran hymn: “Thy strong word bespeaks us righteous.” Cf. U. 
Wilckens, Der Brief an die Römer (3 vols; EKKNT; Neukirchen: Benziger, 1978-82), 1.188 n.39: “die 
Sünde aller [ist] also der Ort, an dem die Gottesgerechtigkeit wirksam wird”. 
50 J.A. Linebaugh, “The Grammar of the Gospel: Justification as a Theological Criterion in the 
Reformation and Galatians,” SJT 71.3 (2018): 287-307. 
51 LW 8:39. 
52 K. Tanner, Christ the Key (Cambridge: CUP, 2010), 64-65. 
53 LW 36:67. 
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The divide between the creature and the sinner is life and death; that between 
the sinner and the new creature is death and life. “I died to the law,” “I have been 
crucified with Christ,” “I no longer live”—these moments of Paul’s confession 
gesture towards a discontinuity as deep as death. “Christ lives in me,” “the life I now 
live”—these indicate a rupture as fundamental as resurrection.54 There are, to borrow 
an image from Lou Martyn, “no through trains” from the old I to the new: “not 
development or maturation,” comments Eastman on Galatians 2:20, but “death and 
resurrection…are the watchwords of Christian existence.”55 To hear Paul’s confession 
is to encounter, as Tanner puts it, a “discontinuous radical leap between qualitatively 
different conditions,” a passage from “next to nothing” to “everything.”56 
As Luther works to communicate the non-identity of the no longer and now 
living I, he starts, again, to speak “the speech of the dead”: “I am dead; “by my own 
life I am not living.”57 For Luther, the Pauline insistence that “I no longer live” 
generates a corresponding confession, captured succinctly and with full shock in the 
phrase, “I am not me” (Bob Dylan). With the phrase ζῶ οὐκέτι ἐγώ, Luther 
comments, “Paul clearly shows how he is alive,” locating life outside of rather than 
“in my own person or substance.”58 As The Freedom of a Christian concludes, “a 
Christian lives not in him or herself,” but rather, to return to Luther’s Galatians 
commentary, the gospel “snatches us away from ourselves and places us outside 
ourselves” (nos extra nos).59 For Luther, as Wilfried Joest suggest, the essence (or 
Wesen) of a person lies not in but out—a person is not in sich und für sich but extra 
se.60 Existence, to borrow Kelsey’s title, is eccentric.   
That the person lives outside the self, however, does not imply that they live 
nowhere. According to Galatians 2:20, life is specifically located: “Christ lives in 
me”; “I live in faith.”61 These dative clauses are debated. Christ living ἐν ἐµοί, as the 
majority of commentators argue, can be locative, but it is also possible, with Calvin, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Cf. J.M.G. Barclay, Paul and the Gift (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015), 386: Paul’s “language of 
‘death’ and ‘life’…marks a radical disjunction.” 
55 Eastman, Paul and the Person, 174; cf. S. Chester, “Apocalyptic Union: Martin Luther’s Account of 
Faith in Christ,” in In Christ in Paul: Explorations in Paul’s Theology of Union and Participation (eds. 
M.J. Thate, K.J. Vanhoozer, and C.R. Campbell; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2018), 378: for “Luther,” 
Galatians 2:19-20” describes “not…the gradual healing of the self but…its death.” See also Hampson, 
Christian Contradictions, 101: “there is no linear progress from being a sinner to being justified.” 
56 Tanner, Christ the Key, 65. 
57 LW 26:170. 
58 LW 26:166. 
59 LW 26:387; WA 7:69, 12-13. 
60 Joest, Ontologie der Person bei Luther, 234, 249. Cf. McFarland, “The Upward Call,” 224: “the 
determining factor,” when identifying who a person is, “is not anything intrinsic to and thus located 
within the individual, but extrinsic: constituted entirely by God’s address.” 
61 Paul also locates life “in the flesh,” a phrase that Luther interprets as follows: “I do live in the flesh, 
yet not on the basis of the flesh or according to the flesh” (LW 26:172). As Eastman argues, this 
localizing of life “in the flesh” also indicates that the person is always embodied and socially 
embedded (Paul and the Person). The other crucial question raised here, but not considered in this 
paper, is the relationship between the I in grace and the I in glory (i.e., between the person redeemed 
and in Christ and the person resurrected and with Christ). Both Romans 8 and 1 Corinthians 15 point to 
a material continuity, but the latter’s language of “spiritual body” catches something of the dialectic 
explored here: it is the body that is raised, but precisely that body is new. The Easter narratives capture 
this as well: the body of the risen Christ is different, but that it is the body of Jesus is evident as the 
tomb is empty and the wounds remains. Allen suggests that one way to express this double “nature of 
the new” is to say that we are dealing not with “transubstantiation” but with “transfiguration” 
(Sanctification). 
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to read it as a dative of respect: Christ, who is not me, lives for me.62 Similarly, life ἐν 
πίστει may, as most take it, be instrumental (i.e., “by faith”), though as de Boer 
contends, it could be a dative of sphere, indicating the “territory where Christ is 
Lord.”63 Whatever one decides, for Luther, the datives define life in relationship—
specifically in relationship to Christ in whom I trust and who lives in and for me. The 
corollary to living extra se, according to Joest, is that one is “carried” by another.64  
Luther’s way of emphasizing this in the Galatians commentary is to say that the life of 
the I that is ex-centric is also alien. There is, he writes, “an alien life, that of Christ in 
me.”65 As Luther’s early lectures on Romans have it, we live both outside ourselves 
and in another: extra nos et in Christo.66 The life that is confessed as “not I, but Christ 
in me” is grounded outside of the self and in relationship to Christ. Barclay is thus 
reading Paul with Luther when he describes this “wholly reconstituted existence” as 
“suspended by” and “founded on…the life of another, the life of ‘Christ in me.’”67  
Galatians 2:19-20 can therefore be said to “disclose and require,” as Eastman 
argues, “an intersubjective account of the person,” an account in which to be is, in 
Ebeling’s phrase, to be “in relationship” (in relatione).68 This is, according to Luther, 
precisely the sort of definition Paul provides in Romans 3:28. As thesis 32 of the 
Disputatio de homine asserts: “the human being is justified by faith.”69 On Luther’s 
reading, to “live by faith in the Son of God” defines human being because it locates 
life in relationship to the one who “loves me and gave himself for me.” Faith, in other 
words, is not a predicate of a self-defined person; it is, rather, a name for the relation 
with Christ that creates and carries the person—it is being grounded in gift. This 
definition encompasses both creation and new creation: out of nothing, by grace, God 
creates; out of sin and death, by grace, God redeems and resurrects.70  
On Luther’s reading of Paul, faith is righteousness because of the one to 
whom it relates: “faith…takes hold of Christ…the One who is present in faith.”71 In 
Galatians 2:19-20, Paul’s language and grammar gesture in this direction. Death and 
life are situated to and with and in—that is, with and in relationship—to God and 
Christ: “live to God;” “crucified with Christ;” “Christ lives in me;” “I live by faith in 
the Son of God.”72 Luther’s image of the “happy exchange” is a way of depicting 
these dynamic relationships: it is not just an exchange of properties (i.e., our sin for 
Christ’s righteousness); it is a communion of persons. Because Christ “took upon 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 See M. Allen, Justification and the Gospel: Understanding the Contexts and Controversies (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2013), 104. 
63 de Boer, Galatians, 157. 
64 Joest, Ontologie, 261-62. 
65 LW 26:170. Joest introduces the term “exzentrisch” (Ontologie, 233-353). For variations, see e.g., 
ecstatic (Oberman), a-centric (Allen), and eccentric (Kelsey). 
66 WA 56:159; LW 25:136. 
67 Barclay, Paul and the Gift, 379, 386.  
68 Eastman, Paul and the Person, 152; Ebeling, Lutherstudien, 156-57. Cf. N. Slenckza, “Luther’s 
Anthropology,” in Oxford Handbook of Martin Luther’s Theology (ed. R. Kolb, I. Dingel, and L. 
Batka; Oxford: OUP, 2015) and R. Saarinen, “Martin Luther and Relational Thinking,” in Oxford 
Research Encyclopedia of Religion (Oxford: OUP, 2017). 
69 LW 34:139. As Bayer points out, because this is a definition, Luther’s Latin—“Hominem iustificari 
fide”—is better rendered, “the human being is human in being justified by faith” (Martin Luther’s 
Theology, 155 n. 3); cf. Slenckza, “Luther’s Anthropology.” 
70 Cf. Bayer, Martin Luther’s Theology, 156: “As created being, human existence is justified-through-
faith existence. As justified-through-faith existence, it is created existence.” 
71 LW 26:129-30. 
72 For Luther, the phrases extra se, coram deo, and in Christo are ways of referring to these 
relationships. 
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himself our sinful person and granted us his innocent and victorious person,” because 
he became “Peter the denier, Paul the persecutor…David the adulterer” and “the 
person of all people,” Luther invites us to sing, “mine are Christ’s living and dying” 
and, joining with the Song of Songs, “my beloved is mine and I am his.”73  
Such a song, of course, is only sung east of Easter and thus on the far side of 
the divide Paul calls death. This life, in other words, is not a given; it is given—it is a 
gift. According to Galatians 2:20-21, “the grace of God” with which I die and in 
which I live is the self-giving of the “Son of God who loved me and gave himself for 
me.”74 The content of grace, as Barclay suggests, is Christ crucified and risen; 
correspondingly, the character of grace is incongruity—a gift that comes as God’s 
“counter statement to the possible,” giving righteousness at the site of sin and creating 
life out of death. As another Pauline confession puts it, “by grace, I am” (1 Cor 
15:10).  
The life of the now living I can thus be called christological—I am in Christ—
but also ex-centric, alien, and charismatic—I am: outside myself, in another, as gift. 
Or again, to combine Dylan and Luther, I am both “not me” and, by grace, “as 
Christ.”75 
 
Yes: I am Loved 
 
Daphne Hampson asks a question at this point that forces us to ask our 
opening question one more time.76 Recognizing that Luther’s reading of Paul is in the 
tradition of what William James calls “twice born” religion, Hampson provides an 
apology for the “once born” variety. “I should not,” she says, “wish to base myself on 
that which lies outside myself… I am interested in what I should call being ‘centered’ 
in oneself (as opposed…to living extra se)… I am concerned for the transformation of 
the self, rather than the breaking of self.” Her rationale here is deep: marginalized and 
oppressed persons are not helped but harmed by being “told that [the] self needs to 
be” shattered.77 This protest contains a crucial question: are soteriologies of death and 
resurrection—that is, accounts of salvation like we encounter in Galatians and 
Luther’s reading of it—finally opposed to the human person? Does the announcement 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 LW 26:280-84; Freedom of the Christian, 287. Cf. Eastman who argues that Paul’s language of 
“union discloses a relational notion of the person” (Paul and the Person, 153) and Vanhoozer who 
plays with the resonance between union, communion, and communication (“From ‘Blessed in Christ’ 
to ‘Being in Christ,’” 27-28). 
74 See Bayer who, with reference to Galatians 2:19-20, speaks of “a gift from someone else, by whose 
life I live” (Martin Luther’s Theology, 235). Bonhoeffer offers another definition of death in these 
terms: being dead is “having to live.” Being alive, then, is having life—death is life as demand; life is 
life as gift (Creation and Fall). 
75 LW 26:168: “by [faith] you are so cemented to Christ that he and you are one person, 
which…declares: ‘I am as Christ,’ and Christ, in turn, says, ‘I am as that sinner.’” 
76 Hampson also asks about the place of love in Luther’s theology. If Christ and the Christian are, in 
Luther’s words, “so cemented” that he and they “are as one person,” does not the otherness of the I and 
Christ collapse? But love, Hampson contends, is “bi-polar”; it demands two rather than one and so, by 
definition, disappears if the “distance” and distinction between persons is lost. (Christian 
Contradictions, 29-39, 246). For Luther, however, oneness with Christ does not, as Bayer puts it, 
“denote an identity without distinction” (Martin Luther’s Theology, 229 n. 31). To be “as one person” 
with Christ, Luther writes, is to be in a relation “more intimate than a husband and wife.” Personal 
union, in other words, is a relational notion; it names a communion of persons even as it anchors one 
(the creature) in the other (Christ). Cf. Elert, The Structure of Lutheranism (trans. W.A. Hansen; St. 
Louis: Concordia, 1962), 176 and Ebeling, The Truth of the Gospel, 149.  
77 Hampson, Christian Contradictions, 237-41; see also Hampson, “Luther on the Self: A Feminist 
Critique,” Word and World 8:4 (1988): 334-42. 
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of the death of the I eliminate the possibility of God’s love for the I? If I only am 
outside myself and in Christ, does God ever look at and love me? 
These questions are an acute way of asking whether and in what sense there is 
continuity between the no longer living and the now living I. One possible answer is 
to ground personal continuity in creation. For Thomas Aquinas, as we have seen, 
created life is not lost—sin is not defined as death—and therefore God always and 
ever loves God’s creatures and, in grace, it is precisely their natures as created and 
fallen that are perfected and healed so that it is finally they who are beheld and 
beloved.78 In Galatians 2:20, however, the drama and “disjunction between old and 
new… entails,” as John Webster notes, “the exclusion of certain ways of 
understanding the continuity of the self.” It is not, for instance, that “the old and new 
are points on a continuum” that only indicate “different dispositions of a subject that 
is [finally] self-identical.”79 The discontinuity is more fundamental—it is death. To 
capture this, readers of Paul refer to “a radical break” and a “reversal” or “counter-
movement…that is wholly incongruous with the prior conditions” and possibilities of 
“human history.”80  
That, however, is not the whole story. Both Barclay and Eastman, whom I just 
quoted, also point to a paradoxical congruity and continuity. For Barclay, God’s 
incongruous gifts are “entirely congruous” with God’s promises and, as Eastman 
adds, the “continuity of the person” is anchored in being addressed by God’s promise 
and call. In Luther’s phrase, as both creature and new creature, the person is creatura 
verbi—a creature of the word: called, by grace and from nothing, into being and 
called, by grace and out of sin and death, righteous and alive.81  
But again: is (or are) the I as created and fallen and recreated the same? If the 
distance between the old and new is death—and if the “life I now live” is extra se, in 
Christo, and sola gratia—does the person persist? Galatians 2:20 gestures towards an 
answer to this question in a way that responds directly to Daphne Hampson’s concern 
about the elimination of love. According to Paul’s confession, there is a “me” that 
Christ loved and gave himself for. Pro me—for me: for Luther, “this brief 
pronoun”—“me”—is “true power.” “Anyone who can speak” and “apply it to her or 
himself,” he says, “defines Christ properly” as “grace” and “savior,” as “mercy” and 
as he who “gives and is given.” The power of this pronoun, in other words, is that it 
gives peace to “a trembling and troubled heart” and thus “rest to your bones and 
mine.”82 What this picks up on is the Pauline identification of those whom Christ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 For two recent engagements with Catholic reflection on nature and grace and what Protestant 
theology might learn from and contribute to that conversation, see Allen, Sanctification, 212-25 and 
McFarland, “The Upward Call.” 
79 J. Webster, “Eschatology, Ontology, and Human Action,” TJT 7.1 (1991): 4-18 (5). In one sense, this 
essay is an attempt to engage Webster’s question about the anthropological and ontological entailments 
of Paul’s language in places like Galatians 2:20 and 2 Corinthians 5:17 (4-5). What Webster calls for is 
a “metaphysics of the solus Christus” (10). 
80 Eastman, Paul and the Person, 174; Barclay, Paul and the Gift, 412-14. McFarland also asks about 
the “discontinuity between human existence as created and redeemed” and argues that while “there is 
nothing in our natures…that serves as the pivot point…that guarantees that the beings we are 
now…subsist across that divide,” we can nevertheless say that “our natures are not destroyed or left 
behind” because it is “we, body and soul, who live with God in glory” even though “we do not do so 
because of the qualities of our souls or bodies” (“The Upward Call,” 236). 
81 That the person is anchor by a word of address entails that humans are, as McFarland points out, “the 
sort of creatures that can respond when called”—that they are spoken to precisely as the kind of 
creature who are both receptive response-able (“The Upward Call,” 224; O. Bayer, Freedom in 
Response).  
82 LW 26:177-78. 
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loves and those to whom he gives himself: Christ gave himself to deliver “us,” says 
Galatians 1:4; the son of God loved and gave himself for me,” adds Galatians 2:20. 
Luther wants to know, “Who is this me?” His answer, “It is I, an accursed and 
damned sinner,” resonates especially with Romans 5:6-10. The me—the us—that 
Jesus loved and gave himself for is me as a sinner and an enemy, me when I was 
weak and ungodly. This I may no longer live, but this I was and is loved. According 
to Paul, the self does not survive salvation—the old ἄνθρωπος dies. But the gospel 
says, in the words of the novelist Walker Percy, “I love you dead” (cf. Eph 2:1-4).83 
The persistence of the person, in other words, is not grounded in the person: I am not 
me but, by grace, in Christ. But it is exactly this grace and this Christ—the one who 
loved me and gave himself for me—that establishes a kind of continuity, what might 
be called the passive persistence of the person. The cross is, at once, a death that 
breaks the story of the self into two even as it is a gift and love that has a way of 
holding it together. I may no longer live, but, in the dative and accusative cases if you 
will—in the cases of the creature and receiver—there is and was and will be a me 
who is persistently loved and graced by God.84 
So finally: Is (or are) the no longer and now living I the same? Paul’s “strange 
and un-heard of” confession requires a dialectical conclusion, one that both unburdens 
those carrying the weight of their own worth even as it sings “I love you” to those 
who disbelieve they could ever hear such words. No: death and life divide the no 
longer and now living I and the life of the latter is gifted, ex-centric, and in Christ. 
But also yes: though I no longer live, there is a me that is ever and always loved. To 
speak “the speech of the dead,” it seems, is to talk twice: life and death and death and 
life separate the self. And yet, in and across the passages of creation, sin, grace, and 
glory there is a me that is loved and loved and loved and loved. To combine the 
confession: I am—outside myself, by grace, and in Christ a me whom God did, does, 













   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 W. Percy, Love in the Ruins (New York: Picador, 1971), 68. 
84 See Bayer, who refers to the “dative of gifted-existence” (“The Being of Christ in Faith”).  
